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From “She Would Say That, Wouldn’t She?” to “Does She Take Sugar?” 
Epistemic Injustice and Disability 
      Jackie Leach Scully 
 
Abstract: Epistemic injustice is the idea that social power ensures that the knowledge 
of some groups is excluded from the collective epistemic resources. In this paper, I 
argue that there are distinctive features of disabled life that, because they shape the 
processes through which knowledge is gathered, evaluated, judged and disseminated, 
also influence the ways in which epistemic injustice is experienced by disabled 
people. These features include the ascription of a global epistemic incapacity to 
people affected by impairment. Against a background of contemporary political shifts 
and biotechnology innovation, the implications of epistemic injustice for disabled 
people are serious. 
 
Keywords: disability and epistemic injustice, epistemic exclusion, impairment, 
epistemic injustice and marginalized groups 
 
1. Susan’s story 
Susan has been profoundly deaf since childhood. She is a hearing aid wearer, and 
likes to use the induction loops built into some public spaces, such as theatres and 
cinemas, to help cut down the background noise that can make hearing speech very 
difficult. But this depends on the building having an induction loop fitted and 
properly maintained. Like many other induction loop users, Susan frequently finds 
that the advertised loop system is either working poorly or not working at all. Almost 
as often, she then has the experience of making a complaint about it only to have the 
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problem denied. (“Of course there is a loop. Of course it’s switched on, and of course 
it’s working.”) If she persists, she is often then met by the suggestion that she doesn’t 
know what she’s talking about: Susan, who’s been wearing aids for forty-five years, is 
told that she misunderstands how to use the equipment properly, or asked whether, 
perhaps, she’s just forgotten to switch on her hearing aid.  
2. The taxonomy of epistemic injustice  
Concepts relating to epistemic injustice have stimulated a lot of recent academic 
interest. Epistemic exclusion is the notion that social position and power align with 
certain forms of epistemic power, that is, power over the ways in which knowledge is 
accumulated within, acknowledged by, and disseminated through communities, with 
the result that some kinds of knowledge can be kept out of mainstream sight. There is 
a growing taxonomy of injustices that follows from the epistemic exclusion of 
marginalized social groups. They involve wronging another person in her capacity as 
a knower, but they operate in different ways and cause different forms of harm.  
This burgeoning field of inquiry has so far concentrated on the knowledge 
associated with the social marginalities of gender and race (and, occasionally, also 
gender identity). Aside from some discussion of epistemic power processes operating 
in the broad context of health care (Carel and Kidd 2014), detailed considerations of 
what epistemic injustice might mean for disabled people are scarce: Elizabeth 
Barnes’s recent work stands out here (Barnes 2016; see also Tremain 2017). In this 
paper, I provide a brief outline of what is meant by epistemic injustice, and argue that 
disability provides some particularly troubling and complex instances. I will examine 
the commonalities between disability and other social identities affected by epistemic 
exclusion, and then consider how disability is distinctive by virtue of the specific 
forms of epistemic exclusion and injustice that disabled people experience. Finally, I 
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will suggest that recognizing the distorting power of epistemic injustice is of crucial 
importance to disability bioethics.    
 Ideas of epistemic injustice, agency, exclusion, oppression, and so on are 
grounded in a social epistemology: that is, an epistemology in which there is no such 
thing as an isolated, atomized “knower.” For a person to perceive, describe, account 
for, and evaluate experience, she needs a set of epistemic tools, including “language 
to formulate propositions, concepts to make sense of experience, procedures to 
approach the world, and standards to judge particular accounts of experience” 
(Pohlhaus 2012, 718) drawn from her community’s shared epistemic resources. To 
social epistemologists, knowledge is situated and particular, generated out of the 
concrete circumstances of groups and communities and the biographies of their 
members (Walker 1998). And while some experiences are shared by the majority of 
people, others are more specific to situations and circumstances. As a result, not all 
epistemic resources are held in common.  
 Epistemic injustice is one harmful manifestation of a broader phenomenon of 
epistemic exclusion. In epistemic exclusion, certain kinds of knowledge are refused 
admission into the general shared stock (Langton 2000). Although epistemic 
exclusion frequently (and, perhaps, inevitably) follows from oppressive power 
relations that marginalize certain social groups, it is, nevertheless, important to 
recognize that not all epistemic exclusion is unjust or even harmful. There are obvious 
reasons some kinds of knowledge need not, or should not, be included in a 
community’s epistemic store. The knowledge may simply be irrelevant: the epistemic 
resource labeled “secular Jewish life” is richly stocked even without the inclusion of 
the knowledge called “plumbing skills,” useful though the latter is. The knowledge 
may be considered too harmful, corrupting, or psychologically damaging; and there 
 4 
are sound ethical reasons why knowledge that is appropriate in one setting should be 
kept well away from others (soldiers may need to know how to kill on the battlefield 
but often wish profoundly not to bring that knowledge back home with them). 
 The two “classes” of epistemic injustice first characterized by Miranda Fricker 
(2007) are still the primary focus of normative analysis. What she identified as 
testimonial injustice is at play when mainstream society holds an identity prejudice 
against a specific group, and sees members of that group as having “a deflated level 
of credibility” (158). The result is a targeted, if unconscious, downgrading of trust in 
the accounts and claims of anyone from that group.  
Testimonial injustice can operate through individual actions and responses. 
For example, Teresa tells me that she is stared at or abused on every trip she makes to 
the supermarket because her spina bifida means that she wears a caliper and has an 
unusual gait. I might not be rude enough to say so, but privately I think she must be 
exaggerating, or at least be hypersensitive to perfectly ordinary glances or comments. 
Since I personally haven’t experienced anything of the kind, and I’m confident that I 
don’t stare at disabled people, I find it hard to credit what she says. An underlying 
societal prejudice against disability reinforces my scepticism, and unless something 
happens to convince me of the truth of her claim – perhaps there’s an instance of clear 
abuse when we happen to be out shopping together – then my lingering disbelief is 
likely to color our whole relationship, blocking the very kind of openness that might 
encourage me to think myself mistaken. 
Testimonial injustice that is inflicted systematically across a range of social 
contexts may be even more damaging and insidious than when it is experienced at the 
hands of an individual – not least because it is often an undifferentiated response to 
members of a group, irrespective of their individual circumstances. So, in addition to 
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my badly hidden scepticism, Teresa’s life is also affected by a ubiquitous suspicion 
built into the official procedures she must go through in order to claim social support. 
Because she can’t stand or walk for long, she is unable to work, and has to prove this 
to the satisfaction of the relevant authorities. Teresa is vulnerable to epistemic 
injustice if they refuse to accept her account of her level of disability. 
Fricker’s (2006) second type of epistemic injustice is hermeneutical injustice. 
This is defined as “having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured 
from collective understanding owing to a structural prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource” (100). As I described earlier, the existence of collective 
epistemic resources is fundamental to a social epistemology: making sense of the 
world requires a previously generated set of concepts, vocabulary, narratives, and so 
on. These resources are internalized early in life, but they originate externally in the 
shared community knowledge that reflects, to a degree, the gathered perspectives of 
the range of groups.  
I say “to a degree,” because the content of collective epistemic resources is 
inevitably skewed by power relations. The differential distribution of social and 
material power creates hierarchies of social position, and social position plays a major 
part in the kinds of experiences a person is likely to have, the knowledge and meaning 
derived from those experiences, and, therefore, the epistemic resources they are likely 
to find salient in making sense of their world (Pohlhaus 2006). At the same time, 
social and material power also confers epistemic authority: some people can 
legitimately establish and enforce epistemic practices (decide the criteria for 
credibility, organize the routes through which knowledge is fed into public discourse 
or policy debates, and so on) while others cannot. The content of any community’s 
epistemic resources tends, therefore, to track along existing social and political 
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contours. In this way, privileged groups have a disproportionate influence on the tools 
available to everyone, while socially marginalized groups are effectively excluded 
from contributing their experiences and knowledge to the collective store. 
 One result of this is that members of privileged groups are far more likely to 
have understandings of their experiences readily to hand, because their lives are 
socially normative. Meanwhile, the marginalization of other social groups means that 
the concepts, vocabulary, and narratives that are particularly salient to making sense 
of their lives are pushed aside.   
3. Epistemic injustice and disability 
Disabled people are commonly denied both epistemic credibility and authority, and 
suffer the consequences. Susan’s story is one example. When it is not easily obvious 
to a nonuser whether a piece of assistive technology is functioning or not, it ought to 
be assumed that someone who is familiar with the technology and who says it isn’t 
working is most likely to be right. This isn’t what usually happens to Susan and other 
induction loop users, though. As a deaf person, her epistemic credibility is 
diminished, irrespective of the evidence or of the logic that says her knowledge is 
probably trustworthy. 
Susan’s is an example of disability-specific testimonial injustice played out on 
an individual level. A case of more systemic epistemic injustice is provided by what is 
known as the central disability paradox: the extensive body of empirical evidence 
suggesting that disabled people can differ markedly from nondisabled people in their 
assessments of the quality of life with impairment. Empirically, disabled people tend 
to describe a “quality” of life only slightly below what nondisabled people report 
having. The important point here is that this suggests that when nondisabled people 
think about life with an impairment, they tend to imagine it as entailing a much worse 
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quality of life than disabled people say they experience (Amundsen 2005, 103; Ubel 
et al. 2005; Edwards 2013). I want to emphasize that this is not always the case, 
especially not for more recently disabled people whose impairment constitutes a 
significant loss and who are still struggling to adapt to their changed circumstances. 
Nevertheless, we have to take seriously the evidence of disabled people saying that 
life with an impairment is not necessarily unbearable or tragic, and may even be a 
substantial and positive part of their identity.  
The two most common responses by nondisabled people to these claims both 
have a quality of “She would say that, wouldn’t she?” The first is to say that the 
perceptions of disabled people (and particularly those who have been disabled since 
birth) are inevitably distorted by their inbuilt epistemic limitation. Since they haven’t 
experienced any alternative, they can do no other than evaluate their state as normal. 
Disabled people rank their quality of life as highly as they do simply because they 
don’t know any better. A second response draws on the idea of adaptive preferences: 
a change in a person’s desires as a response to constrained options, and where the 
shift appears to be from preferring an objectively better state toward a worse one. 
Adaptive preferences are a necessary psychological defense against acknowledging 
the true awfulness of a state that can’t be changed (Elster 1983; Nussbaum 2001).  
But as Barnes (2016) and others have pointed out, the argument from adaptive 
preferences is itself based on the newly preferred or accepted option (in this case, 
disability) being objectively worse than the previous state. In this view, to be disabled 
is to be worse off, and so the argument from adaptive preferences at one stroke 
renders invalid the testimony of some disabled people that they aren’t (129-35). In 
these exchanges, the nondisabled commentator remains committed to the view that if 
what she thinks differs from disabled people’s accounts, then it is the latter who must 
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be mistaken or misguided. This is classic testimonial injustice: because disabled 
people are subject to identity prejudice, they are also subject to diminished credibility. 
Their knowledge is dismissed because it is assumed that their perceptions are 
inherently untrustworthy and possibly self-serving in a way that those of nondisabled 
people are not. 
As well as testimonial injustice, disabled people also experience its 
hermeneutic counterpart. Living with various kinds of impairment results in the 
accumulation of a wealth of quite distinctive knowledge. A wheelchair user, for 
instance, will not only be familiar with technical data about different types of 
wheelchair or how to finance its purchase or repair; they will also have embodied 
knowledge about handling their wheelchair in different environments and weather 
conditions, about how other people respond to wheelchairs and wheelchair users, 
about the physical effects of using a wheelchair, and so on. It is specialized 
knowledge formed by a distinctive set of experiences, and it generally fails to enter 
the routinely available, collective epistemic resources.   
Now, it could be argued that there is no real problem with that, since the 
collective store has no requirement to incorporate routinely knowledge that is specific 
to such a minority population. One possible response is to question just how small a 
minority we are talking about. It is currently estimated that there are 1.2 million 
wheelchair users in the United Kingdom (NHS England n.d.). This is hardly an 
insignificant number: it’s larger than the total number of people attending Anglican 
church services on a typical Sunday, for instance (Sherwood 2016). 
A second point is that only some minority populations are actively 
discriminated against. Disability is not alone in being an unusual embodied 
experience. Professional ballet dancers, for example, are also a minority, and details 
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of the embodied lives of the corps de ballet would be equally alien to most people. 
But there is an important ethical difference between experiential knowledge that 
happens to be accumulated by only a few people, and is represented in the cultural 
resources proportionately, and the epistemic capital of social groups that are 
systemically and systematically suppressed. The former case is probably an example 
of the (relatively) benign epistemic exclusion I mentioned earlier: the knowledge just 
isn’t relevant to most people and, so, doesn’t get wide uptake. But ballet dancers are 
not routinely discriminated against – they may suffer various professional 
unfairnesses, but no more than anyone else. Moreover, and to repeat the point about 
hermeneutic injustice, the community of ballet dancers shares and generally has 
access to a pool of knowledge relevant to their distinctive experiences of buying 
pointe shoes and eschewing chocolate. (I’m guessing here.) And, finally, we should 
also be asking who decides (that is, who has the power to decide) where to set the 
cutoff point between “knowledge relevant to most of us” and “this is of minority 
interest only.” 
4. Effects 
Both testimonial and hermeneutic epistemic injustice cause harm to those on the 
receiving end. Testimonial injustice results from the unwarranted denial or 
devaluation of someone’s epistemic credibility.1 The consequences of this denial are 
extensive, including the subtle and more overt downgrading of the weight given to 
groups’ perspectives, opinions, and needs, and the perpetuation of toxic stereotypes. 
Most fundamentally, a person experiencing testimonial injustice is not being treated 
as an agent capable of contributing to knowledge that is, as Fricker (2007) observed, 
equivalent to being treated as incapable in the capacity for reason – a function central 
to many of our ideas about human personhood (44). People suffering testimonial 
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injustice are, therefore, being denied equal moral status with other humans within 
their community, and this is an important wrong even if the epistemic injustice is 
apparently the only way in which such status is being denied.2 Having their claims 
and accounts epistemically downgraded is guaranteed to unsettle a person’s trust in 
the epistemic and moral value of their own narratives and judgments and, if 
internalized, their confidence in their overall agential capacity. This is an especially 
potent harm to disabled people who, as I discuss later, very often have their status as 
persons of the same moral value as all other persons called into question. 
Hermeneutic injustice, which involves excluding the knowledge of 
stigmatized groups from the collective epistemic resources, is also a wrong to 
someone’s capacity as a knower, but in a different way. If the result of epistemic 
exclusion is that a wheelchair user is deprived of useful knowledge about how to live, 
then they suffer a wrong. Consider a person who has just had a spinal cord injury, and 
knows no other people who are experienced wheelchair users. Or, perhaps, a child 
with a mobility impairment is raised by parents who believe very strongly that, in 
order for her to succeed in the outside world, she needs to be kept away from other 
wheelchair users so that she doesn’t begin to think of herself as “handicapped” in any 
significant way. In both cases, the disabled person does not have access to 
“wheelchair user knowledge” through a community of peers (because they don’t 
know any), and they don’t have access to it via the collective resources (because it 
isn’t there). As a result, they may well be unable to make sense of important areas of 
their personal and social lives. They are deprived of significant routes to self-
understanding, self-confidence, and trust in themselves as epistemic agents, with 
consequences for their sense of identity and of moral and political agency. A person 
who does not have to hand the language and concepts that give a framework of 
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meaning to her everyday experiences will also lack easily available ways of 
formulating and ethically justifying her choices and goals, making moral judgements, 
articulating her experiences as just or unjust, and so on. In other words, through its 
effect on important features of moral agency and identity, an impoverished epistemic 
capacity is also partway to producing impoverished moral capacity as well. 
 The ongoing academic analysis of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice has 
rightly focused on marginalized communities, in part to correct historical neglect and 
to prevent the continuation of that harm into the present. It should not be forgotten, 
though, that epistemic exclusion also causes harm to the larger (mainstream) 
epistemic community. The wider community is dependent for its knowledge on the 
collective epistemic resources. If there are gaps, then, the resources are  
impoverished, and because the knowledge that is present is disproportionately skewed 
to the perceptions of the more powerful group (in this case, nondisabled people), then 
these resources are structurally distorted as well. Even if its members are oblivious to 
it, the wider community is harmed if its epistemic resources could be richer and more 
accurate than they actually are. The capacity for empathy might be affected, for 
example. If it requires the ability to project oneself imaginatively into another 
person’s shoes (Mackenzie and Scully 2007), then not having adequate knowledge of 
the other’s circumstances means that imaginative projections into that other life are 
much more likely to be flawed, and so also to compromise the ability to empathize 
effectively overall.  
But although unwarranted epistemic exclusion can be considered a harm to the 
wider community, it is not an injustice. The majority is not disadvantaged in the same 
way that an individual disabled person would be. Indeed, those in the wider 
community who are flourishing under the status quo of their limited knowledge might 
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reject my assertion that they are harmed by the impoverishment of their epistemic 
resources. They might want to say those resources are fine just as they are since they 
themselves continue to get along perfectly well with no sense of epistemic failure or 
lack. (I would argue they are mistaken, and that being part of a community 
fragmented by epistemic as well as material exclusion and unacknowledged injustice 
is harmful to all its members, including those currently on top; but that’s a wider 
discussion.) 
Moreover, although the collective can act to ameliorate the problem of 
epistemic exclusion, it can also, even unwittingly, exacerbate it. Suppose that, despite 
hermeneutic exclusion, a disabled person is perfectly able to understand and articulate 
her experience. Nevertheless, what she says about it may be rejected by her audience 
in the wider community, not because they don’t find her credible (as would be the 
case with testimonial injustice), but because they are simply unable to make sense of 
what she’s saying. Their own comprehension is underequipped due to the failings in 
their epistemic resources (Dotson 2012, 32). Take the terminology of “ableism” and 
“disablism” that, in analogy with racism and sexism, has been used within disability 
scholarship to describe the phenomenon of systemic prejudice against disabled people 
(Campbell 2008). Without the experiential and theoretical backgrounding that gives 
insight into what it meant by those words, they may be dismissed as incomprehensible 
or unnecessary. This has been described as contributory injustice, and it is caused by 
what Gaile Pohlhaus (2012) characterized as willful hermeneutical ignorance. The 
“willful” is justified because people who engage with disabled knowledge and find it 
alien or implausible have the option of recognizing their own epistemic limitations 3 
and doing whatever is necessary to correct for them. Instead of having the humility to 
recognize that they don’t know quite as much as they think they do, in contributory 
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injustice members of the dominant group compound the problem by insisting on 
trying to comprehend other groups’ epistemic claims within the boundaries of their 
own preexisting frameworks of understanding and judgment, refusing to do the work 
of open self-critique and, where necessary, adjustment. 
5. Disability is distinctive 
Some aspects of the way epistemic injustice operates apply to any socially oppressed 
group. Alongside that, every group will also have some distinct features that set its 
experience of epistemic exclusion apart from others’. In the following section, I 
outline some aspects of disabled life that shape the processes through which 
knowledge is gathered, evaluated, judged, and disseminated within and between 
different communities of disability.4  
a. Diversity of impairment 
The sheer diversity of disability places distinctive constraints on the degree to which 
knowledge can usefully be generalized from one type of impairment to another. Some 
experiences are so widely shared they can be taken as characteristic of disabled 
knowledge: knowing what it is like to be stared at in public because of your physical 
or behavioral anomaly, for example, or being routinely excluded from supposedly 
public events because the venue is inaccessible to you. But an important differential is 
introduced by the fact that some experiences of people with one kind of impairment 
(such as wheelchair users) won’t be shared by those with a different one (limited 
vision, for example), even though both are contained within the category of 
“disabled.”5 The knowledge here isn’t evenly distributed: there is no reason a blind 
person should know any more than a nondisabled person about buying motorized 
wheelchairs. At the same time, the separation isn’t absolute, and there are aspects of 
life with an impairment, and, therefore, kinds of knowledge, that are partially shared. 
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So, blind people know little about wheelchairs, while wheelchair users probably don’t 
know much about guide dogs, but both visually and mobility impaired people are 
likely to find unfamiliar rooms stuffed with close-packed furniture equally 
challenging, although for different reasons.  
b. Isolation from the epistemic community 
Since the late twentieth century, many Western societies have undergone profound 
changes in attitudes toward disability and disabled people. Preeminently but not 
solely in the United Kingdom and the United States, there has been a shift toward 
social policies that mainstream disability in education, housing, and employment.6 
Mainstreaming means that children with impairments are now far more likely to live 
with their families and be educated alongside nondisabled children instead of in 
specialized schools. Disabled adults are more likely to be living independently and 
working in regular jobs alongside nondisabled colleagues rather than in residential 
adult care.7 Most of us would see this decline in segregation of disabled people as 
overall a good thing.  
But one consequence of mainstreaming is that it is now less common for 
disabled people to be part of a physical community of others, or even to know another 
person, with the same or similar impairments. Again, there are many reasons this is 
generally better for those individuals and for the wider communities in which they 
now have the opportunity to play a fuller role. However, it also means it is harder for 
disabled people to find the kind of network that holds minority knowledge about 
living with a particular impairment. Women and ethnic minorities are epistemically 
marginalized from the dominant group of white men, but they do not usually live in 
isolation from each other and don’t normally have to create their own understandings 
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de novo, because a community within which their marginalized knowledge is 
supported already exists.8  
A particularly contentious example is the experience of the signing Deaf 9 
community, where there is considerable ambivalence about the benefits of educational 
mainstreaming. According to one estimate, there were seventy-five schools for the 
deaf in the United Kingdom in 1982 (Moore 2008); by 2010, this had fallen to 
twenty-three (Consortium for Research into Deaf Education 2011). Historically, 
schools for the deaf and Deaf Clubs were the places where deaf children learnt sign 
language, were exposed to Deaf culture, and absorbed the embodied knowledge of the 
Deaf world. Currently, there is a lot of anxiety within the Deaf world about how to 
maintain Deaf language and culture in a context where deaf people are more scattered 
through the hearing world and less often come together to form a critical mass 
(Padden and Humphries 2005; Bauman 2008; Lane et al. 2011). 
c. Systemic exclusion in health and social care 
When individual members of a dominant group treat marginalized others unjustly, it’s 
still possible for them to reach a point where they realize what they have done, and try 
to correct it and make amends. Perhaps, you have been a friend of Susan’s for years, 
and privately wish she’d stop banging on about the inadequacy of induction loop 
provision. She clearly has a chip on her shoulder about it, and you’re sure it can’t be 
nearly as bad as she makes out. But then your own father develops age-related hearing 
loss. He starts using hearing aids, and now he too complains about the lack of 
induction loops in public spaces. Perhaps Susan wasn’t making a fuss about nothing 
after all? Feeling embarrassment and remorse, you acknowledge your crassness and 
resolve in future to be a little more humble in the way you respond to the claims of 
disabled people.  
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But however worthy your personal attempt to become a more “virtuous 
knower,” it will probably make no real difference to most disabled people’s lives 
(other than easing tension between you and your good friend Susan) if the policies, 
practices, and epistemological structures of the rest of society remain unchanged. 
Individuals are generally more epistemically flexible than institutions and 
organizations, and this point carries particular force for any group that has more than 
average exposure to professional expertise. Disabled people and their families 
generally need medical or social care at some point in their lives; these needs can be 
minor, but they can also be extensive and lifelong. Whether the context is a 
consultation with a medical professional or an application for social security 
payments, the institutions of health and social care tend to have rigid expectations of 
the language, narratives, forms of evidence, and so on that they are prepared to take 
seriously. For a disabled person’s knowledge to be treated as valid in these 
professional contexts, she must be sure to communicate it using the tools considered 
appropriate by the institution. Many disabled people will be unable or unwilling to do 
so. They may not be comfortable with the technical language (or if they are, may 
come across as suspiciously knowledgeable for a nonprofessional); they may express 
themselves too emotionally or rely too much on anecdote; or it could be that they 
know perfectly well how to do it, but are fed up of playing that particular game.  
However sympathetic an individual clinician or social worker, the institutions of 
health and social care hold enormous structural epistemic privilege, and there is 
always a risk that what a disabled person says will be dismissed as biased, 
exaggerated, limited, or incomprehensible. The key point here is that the highly 
specialised epistemological regimes of health and social care can be omnipresent in 
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disabled people’s everyday lives in a way that is less often true for nondisabled 
people. 
d. Global epistemic incapacity: “Does she take sugar?”  
The philosopher and disability scholar Adrienne Asch remarked on the way that 
impairment is a single trait that can overwhelm everything else we know about a 
person and the life they lead (or, in the case of prenatal testing, the life they might go 
on to lead) (Asch and Wasserman 2005). Disabled people often comment that others 
“don’t look past the disability.” In the epistemic arena, this plays out in the ascription 
of what I call global epistemic incapacity. The fact of impairment by itself is taken to 
render someone incapable of being a source of reliable knowledge, irrespective of 
whether the impairment itself might reasonably be expected to do so.  
Although this phenomenon is not unique to disability, the degree to which it 
happens is.10 When women are considered epistemically flawed, the rationale isn’t 
usually that they have an intrinsic cognitive impairment but because of their 
disadvantaged social position, limited education, or lack of wider world experience. 
Similarly, a black person’s account of discrimination is more likely to be dismissed 
because of a belief that she is resentful of white privilege and hypersensitive to minor 
slights than because she is thought to be so epistemically incompetent she mistakenly 
sees discrimination where there is none.  
This means that for gender, ethnicity, sexual identity, and so on, the feature 
that is the “reason” behind someone’s social marginalization is not precisely the same 
feature that justifies their epistemic exclusion. Women are marginalized from the 
mainstream contours of power and authority because of their gender; it isn’t simply 
because of that identity that their knowledge is discounted, though, but because some 
real or imagined consequence of being a woman leads to the conclusion that their 
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accounts are not worth real attention. Black communities are not considered 
epistemically compromised because of their skin color, but because their ethnicity has 
downstream effects (it’s thought) on what they can know. In both cases, it’s a 
contingent rather than intrinsic epistemic inferiority (though no less toxic for that).11  
By contrast, disability is often understood as global impairment – that is, that 
having one kind of impaired functionality necessarily compromises the ability to do 
all sorts of other things as well, up to and including understanding one’s own 
environment, preferences, and so on. Many disabled people can give examples from 
their lives of “Does she take sugar?” occasions. The phrase references the moment 
when a nondisabled person directs a question not at a disabled person herself but at 
her companion, clearly believing that, say, a mobility impairment renders her 
incapable of knowing or communicating how sweet she likes her tea. (So familiar are 
these occasions that Does He Take Sugar? was used as the title of BBC Radio 4’s 
flagship disability program from 1977 to1998.) Similarly, someone with a visual 
impairment may be spoken to with an ostentatiously simplified vocabulary, or a deaf 
person assumed to be ignorant of current political events. In other words, an 
impairment that ostensibly has no impact on a person’s epistemic abilities is treated as 
if it did.  
One note of caution: earlier, I was critical of the tendency to conflate the 
enormous diversity of impairment under the umbrella heading “disability,” and I 
don’t want to do the same thing here. The complicating factor in this argument is that 
some learning disabilities, severe developmental disorders, and mental health 
problems genuinely do compromise a person’s ability to comprehend their world (or, 
perhaps, more accurately, their ability to comprehend the world and communicate it 
in the same way as the majority). These impairments present genuine cognitive and 
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communicative barriers to making use of shared epistemic resources or providing an 
account of one’s life that others will find credible. Nevertheless, they can mostly be 
distinguished from impairments that have little or no obvious effect on perception, 
cognition, or communication, and that, therefore, have no obvious epistemic 
consequences. 
e. Bad bodies = bad knowledge 
Structural epistemic inequalities result in the experiences and insights of marginalized 
groups being largely obscured from majority view, but the sheer fact of exclusion 
need not imply any strongly negative opinion about the knowledge itself. The value 
ascribed to epistemic resources is a reflection of the ontological value attributed to the 
community that holds them: whether the community is thought to be worth having 
determines whether that community’s knowledge is considered worth having as well. 
If a community is simply not considered to be as valuable as others, then there is 
something about its members that is intrinsically wrong. Women or members of 
despised ethnic groups are not usually considered intrinsically wrong, even by sexists 
or racists. This is a broad claim, and it must be acknowledged that at least some men 
(and a few women) do view women as intrinsically inferior to men, but I don’t think 
they believe that there is an intrinsic wrongness about being a woman such that the 
world would be better off without them (for one thing, the human species would have 
a short future in their absence). The situation with racism is more complicated, but, on 
the whole, although racists think blacks are inferior to whites, only a minority think 
they shouldn’t exist at all. Rather, the racist thinks that blacks should know their 
place, or that they should be somewhere else, like not in my neighborhood.12  
Disability is different. Almost universally, being disabled is considered not 
merely an undesirable or problematic state of being, but one where something has 
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gone awry. The English language reveals this: to be dis-abled or im-paired is to be 
defined as a normative negation, in a way that women, black and ethnic minorities, 
and so on are not. The equivalent would be to refer to women as dis-gendered, and the 
fact that this sounds weird underlines how the construction, and the moral texture, of 
the categories of “women” and “disabled” also differ fundamentally.  
Believing that a disabled person’s state of being is at best regrettable and to be 
avoided if at all possible, and at worst fundamentally wrong, can very easily lead to 
the conclusion that their knowledge, particularly knowing what it is like to be them, is 
irrelevant (what could be epistemically valuable about an ontologically flawed state 
that we hope to get rid of?) or else, in a more metaphysical sense, is contaminated by 
the suffering associated with impairment: the knowledge is not just valueless, but 
actively repellent. (Or, as a colleague once said to me about my research, “Why do 
you want to go into something so yucky?”) 
6. The (bio)ethical importance of disability epistemic injustice  
The various forms of epistemic exclusion and injustice that recent scholarly literature 
identifies are hardly new, even if the rapid inflation of the taxonomy at the moment 
makes it seem so (Kidd et al. 2017). In some ways, however, many subtle variants of 
testimonial, epistemic, contributory, or other injustice are characterized, the central 
moral point has been made: excluding a marginalized group’s knowledge from the 
common epistemic stock is a persistent and powerful way to ensure that its members 
stay pushed to the edges of social life. In this final section, however, I want to indicate 
why there are certain novel features of the contemporary world that mean disabled 
people are increasing likely to suffer from distinctive effects of epistemic injustice, 
and why this is relevant to bioethics.   
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First, there is evidence that the past half-century of progress toward equality 
for disabled people is stalling, or even actively regressing. Since the economic crash 
of 2008 and the rise in conservative and rightwing politics in parts of the West, 
disability scholars and activists have been dismayed to note an increasing number of 
policies that disproportionately harm disabled people, including what in the United 
Kingdom are called “austerity” measures that cut funding for measures that support 
disabled children and adults (Williams-Findlay 2011) to the extent that in 2017 the 
government of the United Kingdom was strongly criticized by the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for its inconsistent and patchy 
approach to protecting disability rights and its failure to audit the impact of its 
austerity policies on disabled people  (Jones et al. 2017). Alongside that is a 
documented rise in reports of hate crimes targeting disabled people (although these 
figures have to be interpreted with care, since the apparent rise could also reflect a 
greater willingness to report it as well as a genuine increase in cases) (Briant et al. 
2013; Cross 2013). These and other observations suggest that the trajectory of slow 
but steady movement toward the goal of the inclusion and equality of disabled people 
may not be as inevitable as we have wanted to believe.  
Second, these social and political shifts are happening at the same time as 
rapid advances in biomedicine, and especially genomics, that offer powerful methods 
of identifying, selecting, and directly altering (“editing”) the genetic variations 
associated with physical and intellectual impairments (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
2016).13 It is important to emphasize that neither the political nor the technological 
transformations can or should be taken as straightforward indicators that societies are 
turning to a modern version of eugenics. Nevertheless, it would be naïve not to ask 
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whether these shifts help to reinforce the view that all forms of unusual embodiment 
are both an unalloyed tragedy and a burden to the family and the state. 
The discipline of bioethics has always had a particularly close, and often 
contentious, relationship with disability. One of bioethics’ primary roles is to evaluate 
the ethical permissibility of novel health care interventions and policies. Typically, 
this requires making a judgment about whatever it is the intervention or policy targets: 
for example, weighing up whether the quality of life of an individual with a particular 
impairment is sufficiently poor that prenatal selection to prevent the birth of that 
individual is morally justifiable. The discussion of epistemic injustice I have given 
here suggests that it is not safe to assume that the resources bioethicists draw on to 
make such evaluations are up to the job. Indeed, there has been longstanding critique, 
especially but not solely by feminist bioethicists, that the experiential and empirical 
knowledge of disabilities that bioethics brings to its deliberations is inadequate.  
There are numerous examples of the consequences this kind of epistemic gap can 
have for ethical thinking, responsible innovation, and health care policy.  
A particularly notorious example is so-called “choosing deaf/disabled babies.” 
An early case, in which two women with genetic deafness expressed a preference for 
a deaf child, and actively increased the chances of getting one by choosing a 
genetically deaf sperm donor (Mundy 2002), has provided material for an impressive 
amount of bioethical publications, presentations, and teaching (see, e.g., Levy 2002; 
Savulescu 2002; Spriggs 2002; Wilkinson 2010; Fahmy 2011; Scully 2011). 
Ultimately, that case also provided part of the motivation for insertion of what is now 
section 14(4)(9) in the U.K. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) that 
prevents licenced fertility clinics using gametes or embryos for pregnancy if they 
have genetic “abnormalities” associated with a risk of “serious physical or mental 
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disability.” As critics have noted, bioethical analyses have tended to make 
assumptions about the motivations behind these apparently counterintuitive 
preferences, and also neglected to examine how often an expressed preference would 
actually be acted upon (Scully 2008; Emery et al. 2010) What little evidence there is 
suggests that deaf people who express a preference for a deaf child would not 
necessarily actually wish to take measures to ensure they got one (Middleton et al. 
1998; Middleton et al. 2001; Stern et al. 2002). Moreover, whether or not the 
reasoning behind the preferences is judged to be morally acceptable, the failure to 
make any effort to find out what that reasoning actually is – to plug the obvious 
epistemic gap – is to treat the knowledge of that particular community with 
disrespect. This would still, therefore, be an injustice, even if it had not contributed to 
the legal provision that some deaf and disabled people find discriminatory (Emery et 
al. 2010). 
Similarly, in a recent project in which people with spinal cord injury discussed 
their needs and interests for the benefit of engineers developing sophisticated assistive 
technologies, participants emphasized that in contrast to what the engineers might 
presume, being able to walk again was not the “holy grail.” Sensory capacity, for 
example, often took higher priority. This information was not readily available to the 
engineers through their own experiences, nor through the collective epistemic 
resources of their wider culture and profession. Without talking with people affected 
by spinal cord injury, large amounts of time and money could be invested in 
developing technologies that ignore the actual needs of the supposed beneficiaries 
because of lack of knowledge.14 And this, too, is an avoidable injustice. There are 
many other examples. 
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I have argued elsewhere (Scully 2008) for a disability bioethics that starts 
from a deeper knowledge of what it is like to live with, or be part of a family affected 
by, disability. The expansion of our epistemic resources on disability becomes an 
ethical requirement. However, as this paper shows, the barriers against doing so are 
very high, and also very resilient (Dotson 2014), perpetuated as they are along with 
the similarly resilient structures of social privilege and power. Part of the ethical task, 
then, is to identify and as far as possible remove the mechanisms that exclude the 
epistemic resources of disabled bodies from their communities’ bodies of knowledge.  
 
NOTES 
1. “Unwarranted” is an important qualifier here. There are, of course, many 
situations in which it makes perfect sense not to confer full credibility. 
Someone may lack specialist or technical knowledge in circumstances where it 
is essential, or may give other evidence of not having relevant experience, 
deliberately lying, being mistaken or deluded, and so on. 
2. Given the complex social and political forces that generate the groups subject 
to testimonial injustice, it is unlikely to be. 
3. I don’t mean by this that the claims of disabled people (or another 
marginalized group) should always be believed, however implausible. Not 
applying similarly rigorous standards of critical examination to all groups is 
just as discriminatory, and in the long term probably as disadvantageous, as 
rejecting the views of marginal groups tout court. 
4. This does not mean that other marginalized groups are homogeneous, only that 
in this section I focus on distinctive features of impairment and disability 
groups. 
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5. For some critics, this diversity calls into question the validity of the umbrella 
term “disability or “disabled people,” however useful it is politically and 
practically. 
6. Policies that are not always followed through in practice, or given the political 
and economic support necessary if they are to be successful. 
7. If they are employed at all. Numerous studies confirm that employment rates 
for people with disabilities are well below those of the nondisabled population 
(e.g., the World Report on Disability [World Health Organization and World 
Bank 2011]) gives average employment rates of 52.8 percent for men with 
disability and 19.6 percent for women with disability, compared to 64.9 
percent for nondisabled men, and 29.9 percent for nondisabled women. 
8. I should add that this feature also applies to LBGTQ individuals, although 
how much is dependent on context. In particular, the spread of global media 
communications means that detailed, positive representations of multiple ways 
of being lesbian, queer, transgender, and so on are increasingly available to 
individuals who may not know any other LBGTQ people in real life (or think 
they don’t). The same is not true for disabled people, since there is compelling 
evidence that they are significantly underrepresented in popular entertainment 
media such as television and film. 
9. I’m using the convention in which “deaf” refers to audiological deafness, 
while “Deaf” refers to the sociolinguistic group characterized by the use of 
signed languages. 
10. In stereotype research, there is a similar concept of “spillover” that refers to a 
stereotype’s ability to affect domains other than those specifically targeted by 
it. 
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11. Of course there are sexists who dismiss women as unreliable epistemic agents 
on the grounds that they are globally inferior to men, and racists who act 
similarly about black people, but I would argue these are extreme views. 
12. The situation with religious prejudice is more complicated. What is 
intrinsically wrong here is the belief or adherence to the faith, not an embodied 
feature like sex or skin color. In some faith groups, like Christianity, 
conversion allows a “wrong” person to become a “right” one in an instant. 
Religious prejudice is further complicated by the way that faith adherence 
tracks with ethnic or national identities. 
13. Here, I suggest, is another important way in which disability and other 
marginal identities differ. However sexist or racist some societies are, there is 
no evidence of widespread enthusiasm for technologies that aim to reduce the 
number of women or ethnic minorities. 
14. I thank Sara Goering for this example. 
 
REFERENCES 
Amundsen, Ron. 2005. “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in 
Biomedical Ethics.” In Quality of Life and Human Difference: Genetic 
Testing, Health Care, and Disability, ed. David Wasserman, Jerome 
Bickerbach, and Robert Wachbroit, 101-24. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Asch, Adrienne, and David Wasserman. 2005. “Where Is the Sin in Synecdoche? 
Prenatal Testing and the Parent-Child Relationship.” In Quality of Life and 
Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability, ed. David 
 27 
Wasserman, Jerome Bickerbach, and Robert Wachbroit, 172-216. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Barnes, Elizabeth. 2016. The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bauman, H-Dirksen L. 2008. Open Your Eyes: Deaf Studies Talking. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Briant, Emma, Nick Watson, and Gregory Philo. 2013. “Reporting Disability in the 
Age of Austerity: The Changing Face of Media Representation of Disability 
and Disabled People in the United Kingdom and the Creation of New ‘Folk 
Devils.’” Disability and Society 28 (6): 874-89. 
Campbell, Fiona Kumari. 2008. “Refusing Able(ness): A Preliminary Conversation 
about Ableism.” M/C Journal 11 (3). <http://journal.media-
culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/46 
Carel, Havi, and Ian James Kidd. 2014. “Epistemic Justice in Healthcare: A 
Philosophical Analysis.” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4): 529-
40. 
Consortium for Research into Deaf Education. 2011. “CRIDE Report on 2011 Survey 
on Education Provision for Deaf Children in England.”  
http://www.batod.org.uk/content/resources/survey/cride-2011/CRIDE2011.pdf 
Cross, Merry. 2013. “Demonised, Impoverished and Now Forced into Isolation: The 
Fate of Disabled People Under Austerity.” Disability and Society 28 (5): 719-
23. 
Dotson, Kristie. 2012. “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression.” 
Frontiers: A Journal of Women’s Studies 33 (1): 24-47. 
 28 
Dotson, Kristie. 2014. “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology 
28 (2): 115-38. 
Edwards, Claire. 2013. “The Anomalous Wellbeing of Disabled People: A 
Response.” Topoi 32 (2): 189-96. 
Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Emery, Steven D., Anna M. Middleton, and Graham H. Turner. 2010. “Whose Deaf 
Genes Are They Anyway? The Deaf Community’s Challenge to Legislation 
on Embryo Selection.” Sign Language Studies 10 (2): 155-69. 
Fahmy, Melissa Seymour. 2011. “On the Supposed Moral Harm of Selecting for 
Deafness.” Bioethics 25 (3): 128-36.  
Fricker, Miranda. 2006. “Powerlessness and Social Interpretation.” Episteme: A 
Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1-2): 96-108. 
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/contents 
Jones, Antonia, Wendy Wilson, Tim Jarett, et al. 2017. The UN Inquiry into the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the UK. London: House of Commons 




Kidd, Ian James, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. eds. 2017. The Routledge 
Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge. 
Lane, Harlan, Richard C. Pillard, and Ulf Hedberg. 2011. The People of the Eye: Deaf 
Ethnicity and Ancestry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Langton, Rae. 2000. “Feminism in Epistemology and Objectification.” In Cambridge 
Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, ed. Miranda Fricker and Jennifer 
Hornsby, 127-45. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Levy, N. 2002. “Deafness, Culture, and Choice.” Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (5): 
284-85.  
Mackenzie, Catriona, and Jackie Leach Scully. 2007. “Moral Imagination, Disability 
and Embodiment.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4): 335-51. 
Middleton, Anna, Jenny Hewison, and Robert Mueller. 1998. “Attitudes of Deaf 
Adults Towards Genetic Testing for Hereditary Deafness.” American Journal 
of Human Genetics 63 (4): 1175-80. 
Middleton, Anna, Jenny Hewison, and Robert Mueller. 2001. “Prenatal Diagnosis for 
Deafness – What Is the Potential Demand?” Journal of Genetics Counseling 
10 (2): 121-31. 
Moore, E. 2008. “A Lesson from History.” British Association for Teachers of the 
Deaf Magazine. March 2008, 4-6 




NHS England. n.d. “Improving Wheelchair Services.” 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/pe/wheelchair-services/ 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2016. Genome Editing: An Ethical Review. London: 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/Genome-editing-an-ethical-review.pdf 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2001. “Symposium on Amartya Sen’s Philosophy 5: Adaptive 
Preferences and Women’s Options.” Economics and Philosophy 17: 67-88 
Padden, Carol A., and Tom Humphries. 2005. Inside Deaf Culture. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Pohlhaus Jr., Gaile. 2006. “Knowing (with) Others.” Social Philosophy Today 22: 
187-98.  
Pohlhaus Jr., Gaile. 2012. “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a 
Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.” Hypatia 27 (4): 715-35.  
Savulescu, Jonathan. 2002. “Deaf Lesbians, ‘Designer Disability,’ and the Future of 
Medicine.” BMJ 325: 771-73. 
Scully, Jackie Leach. 2008. Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Scully, Jackie Leach. 2011. “Choosing Disability, Symbolic Law, and the Media.” 
Medical Law International 11 (3): 197-212. 
Sherwood, Harriet. 2016. “Church of England Weekly Attendance Falls Below 1m 




Spriggs, Merle. 2002. “Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who Is Deaf Like Them.” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 28: 283. http://jme.bmj.com/content/28/5/283 
Stern, S.J., K.S. Arnos, L. Murrelle, et al. 2002. “Attitudes of Deaf and Hard of 
Hearing Subjects Towards Genetic Testing and Prenatal Diagnosis of Hearing 
Loss.” Journal of Medical Genetics 39 (6): 449-53. 
http://jmg.bmj.com/content/39/6/449 
Tremain, Shelley. 2017. “Knowing Disability, Differently.” In Routledge Handbook 
of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus 
Jr., 175-84. New York: Routledge. 
Ubel, Peter A., George Loewenstein, and Norbert Schwarz, et al. 2005. 
“Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care 
Decision Making.” Health Psychology 24 (4): S57-S62 
Walker, Margaret Urban. 1998. Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics. 
New York: Routledge 
Wilkinson, Stephen. 2010. Choosing Tomorrow's Children: The Ethics of Selective 
Reproduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Williams-Findlay, Robert. 2011. “Lifting the Lid on Disabled People Against Cuts.” 
Disability and Society 26 (6): 773-78. 
World Health Organization and World Bank. 2011. World Report on Disability. 





Jackie Leach Scully is a professor of social ethics and bioethics, and Executive 
Director of the Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre at Newcastle 
University, UK. She is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
